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10 'Insidious Conquests': Wartime Politics Along the South-western Shore of Lake Tanganyika

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While the First World War raged in Europe, less sanguinary combat was waged in the heart of Africa. The battles of Lake Tanganyika may have been of relatively little international consequence; the salvos traded between tiny Belgian batteries dug in before remote missionary outposts and steam-powered German launches sporting a gun or two may have been futile; yet the war did prove unsettling to the African populace. As people from distinct worlds were thrust together with great precipitance, so were politics – international, national (metropolitan and colonial) and local-level or village – collapsed in a manner never before experienced. A case study of local-level politics during the war years requires recognition of international and national factors, and reveals how all these political levels were interdependent at such tenebrous times. Certain local factions were able to exploit these special circumstances, and thrive; others could not, and so did not.

The first two sections of this chapter provide the context, before and during the Great War, for one incident of an extended case of conflict concerning rights to land and political prerogative among Tabwa of south-eastern Zaire (others live in north-eastern Zambia). The protagonists were (and are) Tabwa chiefs, Catholic missionaries, civil administrators, and their various supporters. We are fortunate to possess an extraordinarily rich archival and exegetical data base for this conflict, covering over 100 years.¹

BACKGROUND: A SKETCH OF COLONIAL HISTORY PRIOR TO THE WAR

Early in 1883, Lieutenant Emile Storms of the International African Association founded the first permanent European settlement on the western shore of Lake Tanganyika. His fortress at Mpala became an enclave of order in times rendered chaotic by coastal slave traders, Nyamwezi elephant hunters, Ruga-Ruga mercenaries, and ambitious local chiefs, all striving for politicoeconomic advantage through the exploitation of Tabwa residents of the Marungu Massif and adjacent lands. Storms's philosophy, based on the premise that 'all authority ... not based upon force is null and illusory', was put to the test a number of times. When, because of a shift in European politics, he was recalled to Belgium in 1885, a metropolitan newspaper's characterisation of him as 'Emile the First, Emperor of Tanganyika' was not entirely in jest.²

Storms ceded his outpost at Mpala to an able pair of French priests of the Society of African Missionaries, or White Fathers. The elder, Isaac Moinet, intended to implement the dream of the order's founder, Cardinal Lavigerie, that a 'Christian Kingdom' be created in the Central African interior. This was not mere rhetoric, as some have suggested.³ Because of the agreements reached at the Conference of Berlin in 1885 that formalised the partition of the continent, the aspirations of the missionaries would never be fully realised. Yet for nearly a decade, Moinet and his fellow priests, soon seconded by an ex-papal Zouave named Leopold-Louis Joubert, maintained the only European authority in the vast 'Territory of Mpala' west of the lake and east of the Luvua. Under the flag created by Moinet a standing army defended bounds within a nascent Congo Free State; laws were enacted and enforced, and punishment meted for their transgression; a monetary system was based on coins struck at Mpala; commerce, export and import were closely regulated by the Fathers; and a 'state' religion was introduced, with schools for further indoctrination. In short, the 'government', as Joubert liked to refer to himself and to his secular power, could and did intervene in every sphere of local activity. He was truly the 'King', as Cardinal Lavigerie called him, if of only a *de facto* polity.⁴ He proved a fit successor to the 'Emperor of Tanganyika'.

Such prerogative was hard won. As the coastal ivory and slave traders in the Congo became separated from the Sultan of Zanzibar, who, under British influence, sought to curb their activities, one called

Rumaliza (Mohamed bin Khalfan) emerged as dominant among those around Lake Tanganyika. A man with consummate political and military skills, Rumaliza pitted the Belgians, the Germans and the British against one another in his attempt to become 'Master of the whole lake' rather as Tippu Tip had been named Governor of the Arab Zone of the Free State. Joubert at Mpala stood in his way and was attacked with full force. The feisty Breton survived, his success deemed 'providential'.⁵

Great political, economic and social changes were wrought during the decade of the 'Christian Kingdom', at the expense of the energies of Africans and Europeans alike, and of the very lives of more than a dozen of the early missionaries. When, in the mid-1880s, the Free State agents sought to assert their *own* hegemony in the area west of Lake Tanganyika, Joubert and the White Fathers were bitterly resentful. This had been an arena in which simple self-reliance and initiative were not sufficient, where dogged self-assertiveness and, indeed, hubris were required for survival and success. The collision of egos as great as those of Joubert and some of the pioneer Free State officers was inevitable. With some vindictiveness, Joubert was reduced by these latter to 'a simple particular' of the Catholic missions.⁶ The political power of the priests could no longer be exercised as overtly.

During the last years of the nineteenth century and the first years of the twentieth, there was increased Free State activity in the region, which led to the end of the slave trade, but not to a radical decrease in violence to the Tabwa population. Soldiers from the posts at Moliro and Mpweto pillaged the hamlets along their routes through the area, and local people were beaten, robbed and raped. These were also the 'rubber years'. Traders who had engaged in slavery a few years previous turned their talents instead to collecting the stuff. Their methods proved brutal, as did those of Free State administrators involved in the trade; many Tabwa fled southward into the British sphere of Northern Rhodesia.⁷

The White Fathers at the missions of Mpala and Baudouinville (Moba) exploited these circumstances. Late in 1902, the Free State Enclave of Moliro was founded, one of three military divisions in north-western Katanga which would have its own fort and military detachment. The new *Chef de Poste* requested a list of chiefs bringing supplies to or otherwise working for the mission at Baudouinville, that these same not be subject to requisitions for the Moliro garrison. The

Father Superior submitted a list, but Tabwa chief Kitendwe, being a '*mauvaise tête*' or troublemaker, was denounced as no longer a mission loyalist. The Free State officer thereupon sent soldiers to Kitendwe's to conscript one and all for a month's labour building the Moliro fort. Other chiefs of the Marungu Massif who till then had resisted the efforts of the priests at proselytism, were summoned to the mission and told by the Father Superior that for all he cared, they could take themselves to Moliro. The chiefs begged for protection from the soldiers, and the missionary set the following conditions: that all strife cease in the area; that the chiefs agree to build a *chapelle-école* – a chapel and school – at their villages; that they receive there the catechists trained and sent by the priests; that all attend religious instruction, chiefs and subjects alike; and that they remain loyal to the mission, continuing to bring foodstuffs against payment at an exchange determined by the Fathers. Any contravention of these rules would mean immediate denunciation to the *Poste* (where they could expect to receive the same sort of treatment meted Kitendwe). 'The chiefs declared all these conditions acceptable and accepted'.⁸

These acts of the missionaries were at once an affirmation, overtly made to the resident African population, of the continued existence of the Christian Kingdom. In its new guise, the *chapelles-écoles* would become the outposts of the mission, while the *villages chrétiens* immediately adjacent to the missions proper, and whose closely-scrutinised population included freed slaves, orphans and other persons variously marginal to traditional Tabwa life, would provide the catechists and 'seed' families. Already in 1894 a normal school had been founded at Mpala to provide catechists with a four-year course and two-year training period after which they would be sent out in twos, threes or fours. By 1903, there were eight *chapelles-écoles* around the Baudouinville mission, and eight more around that of Mpala. As the years passed, the catechists often assumed important roles in local-level politics, sometimes usurping powers previously enjoyed only by Tabwa chiefs; they also became the nucleus of the tiny African middle class of educated Tabwa who would assume many lowest-echelon administrative positions just prior to and after Independence.⁹

More Europeans entered the area to pursue activities of an ever-widening variety. The White Fathers, however, assiduously strove to maintain their distance from these other Europeans, and

openly competed with them for power.¹⁰ This can be demonstrated by considering several new European roles and activities at the turn of the century.

The first was in the juridical realm, rigidly controlled by Joubert and the priests during the years of the first phase of the Christian Kingdom. Joubert had rendered judgement and administered justice, including capital punishment, within the bounds of the Territory of Mpala. Naturally enough, the Free State officials considered this their own prerogative, and circuit courts were established. The missionaries might react to minor offences, and did, indeed, punish those most directly dependent upon them. For instance, orphans at the mission caught stealing a chicken were given a week's labour in chains, while others guilty of taking cloth from the mission store received the same but more lengthy punishment. The priests, however, were instructed to participate in the established, central legal system for cases of greater weight. This was a charge to which they acceded with difficulty.¹¹

When, in September 1908, Judge Rhode came to Baudouinville on his circuit from Kasongo, it was noted in the mission diary that 'our Christians prefer to bring their little palavers before their Father, than before this stranger who appears every two to three years. Better for them is a paternal punishment at the mission to court, and to return, still without a judgement'. Following this logic, the writer describes two murder cases which were brought to the attention of the missionaries in January of the next year. The scribe admits that they should be sent on to the court; but those involved, apparently plaintiffs as well as defendants, refused to go, because after an arduous journey, their case might well be dismissed. Instead, the priests arranged that goods be given in indemnity to the aggrieved families, and all were sent home. The missionary's comment was that 'the result will be definitive, as they will take revenge themselves'.¹²

The matter of money and taxes was another in which the White Fathers demonstrated their insularity. In July 1911, the old *pesas* of the first phase of the Christian Kingdom were recalled, and new ones bearing a distinctive anchor and wording struck at the Baudouinville mission. Labourers could choose payment in either colonial *francs* or mission *pesas*, although only the latter would be accepted at the mission store. In 1908, a government agent came to collect taxes. The priests' feeling was that they were being sought in the heavily-populated villages around the mission centres only as a matter of convenience. But might this not cause the same people, already

demonstrably ready for flight, to 'desert' the mission? 'We civilise in a Christian manner; perhaps they [the agents] have it in for us!' When, in May of the next year, a tax collector traversed the Marungu Massif, he allowed his men to pillage and burn five villages as punishment for the flight of the inhabitants. This act, for which he was later brought to justice, was interpreted as an insult to lands within the mission territory,¹³ and served only to strengthen the position of the priests as separate from the 'encroaching' government.

Recruitment of labourers for the mining centres of southern Katanga was yet another incursion. The Fathers contended that theirs was an agricultural preserve set aside by the central government, so their people should not be enticed to leave for the cities. As will be discussed below, the central Tabwa *did* provide an extraordinary amount of produce for the war effort; the resistance of the missionaries would prove useful to the overall aims of the colony.¹⁴

All of these areas of concern are best understood in the context of a long-standing metropolitan conflict, whose effects were being felt and applied in the Congo at this time: that is, the ideological contention between Catholic priests, missionaries and their supporters, and Freemasons, Liberals and/or Socialists. The White Fathers were thus accused of brutality in the use of the rod in their schools, and of collusion with those perpetrating the excesses of the rubber years through their silence. Certain Freemasons produced prose meant to be inflammatory: 'Let civilisation perish in the colony if it must be the work of the missionaries, and perish the works of these latter if they must have some influence on this civilization!'¹⁵

Monsignor Roelens, prelate at Baudouinville, often responded on behalf of the missionaries, justifying their 'paternal corrections ... only employed to stimulate the incorrigibly lazy and to reduce the recalcitrant'; denying that excess *did* exist there where the Catholic missions stood (although in other contexts, the same Bishop made political use of allegations of this very nature); and denouncing the allegedly malicious acts of government administrators in Tabwa territory. In the pro-Catholic metropolitan newspaper *Le Patriote*, he accused a tax collector of discouraging Tabwa of the Marungu from attending mission schools and religious instruction and complained that when such abuses were reported to the government, the inquest conducted by a fellow agent was so biased as to invariably find the man innocent. Most irritating of all, Roelens wrote that 'an official station with a garrison has been established in proximity to the mission of Baudouinville [at Mlonde] without any real utility to the colony,

but with the sole goal of ruining the influence of the missionaries on the natives, and of substituting an influence which, in fact, is hostile' to the mission.¹⁶

Jules Renkin, Belgian Colonial Minister (1908–18), responded that such charges were vague and unfounded, and he invited Roelens and the other clerics to bring more specific evidence to their arguments. In 1913, these quarrels reached a high point in the Cambier affair, in which a missionary 24 years in the Congo was accused of having sexual relations with a Congolese woman which provoked the poisoning of the child born. The resultant uproar in both the Congo and Belgium would have repercussions on all levels of politics, colonial and metropolitan, for years to come. Given the intensity of feelings, Renkin and his associates could hardly take lightly these other events along Lake Tanganyika. Their attempts at moderation are reflected in a letter of M. Rutten, Attorney General of the Congo, read before the Belgian House of Representatives:

the Reverend Fathers only resign themselves with difficulty to seeing powers shared that they once exercised alone and almost without overseeing, and which, besides, they only used in doing good; and their tendency to retain these as much as possible, other than being very human, is even more understandable if one realizes that the Blacks generally consider weak ... authority overly divided.

Others found Renkin's stance (and that of his Catholic Party) too conciliatory, and contended that he identified with the missionaries too closely, even as the priests attacked him.¹⁷

Volumes have been written on the complexities of such matters, and allusion is made to them here to bring attention to the fact that, contrary to Markowitz's assertion that 'the anticlerical attacks ... were seldom, if ever, translated into action ... [in the Congo, since] "anticlericalism is not an article of exportation"'; such matters *did* impinge upon everyday events in prewar Congo, and *would* influence the case to be presented below. The explanation of the priests, for instance, that persons were forced to move from the immediate vicinity of the Baudouinville mission, in accordance with a sleeping-sickness eradication programme devised by a nihilist 'out of hate for the mission, and to harass its people'; and the counter-charge that the missionaries incited Tabwa to flee this health officer, can be understood only with reference to this wider context. There may have been a tendency by Catholics to label as 'Freemason' *any* who opposed

them, as was suggested by a contemporary;¹⁸ nevertheless, these proved the terms by which the missionaries could justify their continued striving for autonomy from the state, both to their supporters and to themselves. And this was the dominant feeling – one of mutual distrust – felt by both missionaries and administrators on the eve of the war.

THE GREAT WAR ALONG THE SOUTH-WESTERN SHORE OF LAKE TANGANYIKA

The border between German Tanganyika and the Belgian Congo running down the middle of Lake Tanganyika was closed early in August 1914, as the war began. The Germans quickly took the offensive, that same month firing from a small steamer upon the tent city at the railhead under construction at Albertville. Only weeks later, the mobilisation of the Tabwa population began, in what would be a great and concerted effort at food production to support colonial troops. Catholic missionaries at Mpala, Baudouinville, and other stations assumed the leadership, directing the produce toward the government post at Mpweto; Father Weghsteen, Superior at Mpala, was named military Chaplain and joined the Mpweto garrison. By October, Baudouinville was nearly deserted, all able-bodied men being sent as porters or soldiers to Mpweto or to Abercorn in Northern Rhodesia to join an Anglo-Belgian offensive. Offshore mines were laid; trenches were dug along the shore at both Baudouinville and Mpala, and cannons placed in them; a home guard was joined by soldiers recruited elsewhere in the Congo.¹⁹

The Tabwa of the Marungu Massif and those around Mpala reacted in various ways to this flurry of activity, most frequently – but not always – co-operating to implement the great effort. When the first requisition of food was made around Baudouinville, a nearby chief was flogged by a Belgian officer for showing reluctance to participate. Another misrepresented a subordinate chief as his senior, so that the authorities would turn to the latter as the one responsible for providing men and supplies, and not to him. Most, however, did support the supply programme. Few explicit details are available to indicate why this was so. With reference to incidents like that of Chief Kitendwe 12 years previously, one may speculate that the Tabwa felt compliance on the mission terms was a safer choice than defiance, which would subject them to the wrath of the colonial or military agents. In effect,

as First World War veteran Louis Mulilo recalled 60 years later, local people greatly feared being arrested then, for they would be taken to the 'konseyage' (*conseil de guerre*, the Belgian council of war) where punishments were especially severe. The Christian Kingdom, then, was yet a vital haven.

Such compliance may be contrasted with actions in the north and north-west of Tabwa territory, areas until then relatively isolated from European activity, where there was resistance to tax collecting. At the village of Tabwa chief Tumbwe, only two of the 30 taxable adult males paid taxes in 1913. The standard response to the arrival of the collector was flight, throughout the region peripheral to the missions, for the duration of the war. Those Congolese accompanying the colonial agents were taunted as 'slaves of the white man', and were threatened with bows and arrows. A harried administrator called for a punitive expedition to the area but this never occurred, as military attentions were focused elsewhere. When the majority of colonial agents were conscripted into military service, the few who remained could only complain in frustration of the 'recrudescence of insolence' of the Tabwa population.²⁰

The Germans, using their several small steamers, continued to harrass the Belians living along Lake Tanganyika. The Belgian steamer *Delcommune* was shelled at dock in Albertville; the administrative post at Mtoa was attacked; salvos were exchanged between the tiny battery before the mission at Mpala and a German gunboat lying offshore. More important offensives were directed at the northern lakeshore town of Uvira (whence the Germans hoped to penetrate Kivu) and at English installations at the southern end of the lake. Throughout 1915, German steamers sailed at will along the western side of the lake. In February of that year, they disembarked soldiers at Cape Tembwe, just north of Mpala, who surprised and slew one Belgian officer camped there, wounded and took prisoner another, and killed or wounded more than a dozen Congolese soldiers. Aside from brief forays of this type, however, the Germans seemed content to pin down their enemies. Their more immediate interests lay to the north and south-east of the lake. Above all, they hoped to maintain their ability to transport troops along the eastern coast, unimpeded in either direction, from their own railhead at Kigoma.²¹

Nevertheless, and quite naturally, such events caused great consternation among the missionaries and colonial personnel resident or camping along the lake, whose fears were founded upon knowledge of the atrocities perpetrated in German-occupied Belgium. Patrols of

the home guard stationed at Mpala were increased in frequency and in the distances northward along the lake that they travelled. The missionaries at Mpala promised to build a large grotto shrine like that at Lourdes, should the mission survive the war undamaged, and the Congo remain Belgian.²²

The events at Cape Tembwe were particularly insulting, and the Belgian military felt that Tabwe chiefs must be facilitating German intelligence-gathering. Chief Rutuku Kasali, living just south of Albertville, was related through kinship to Tabwa emigrants living across the lake in German Tanganyika; he was suspected of collaboration, and soon fled to the eastern side of the lake. He denied an accusation that he was transported on a German steamer. His explanation was that coastal people were being evacuated to the interior, to serve as porters or to be useful in other ways, but also to prevent their interaction with German 'spies' landed from the steamers. Rutuku complained that those conscripted found it difficult to obtain sufficient food in lands not their own, where all surplus was requisitioned for the war effort. He chose to join his kinsmen in German territory to avoid suffering such abasement. When captured by the Anglo-Belgian forces invading Tanganyika, he was imprisoned on charges of treason, then acquitted after a year.²³

Tabwa chief Tumbwe Kasambala suffered a less agreeable fate. As an administrator wrote, Tumbwe, like his predecessors, would hardly deign to interact with the Belgian authorities before and at the start of the war. The young chief, who succeeded Tumbwe Kingongo early in 1914, encountered difficulties with some dependents who denied him recognition, and therefore their co-operation. Weeks before the outbreak of war, for instance, a territorial agent was informed that a chief under Tumbwe's command refused to maintain the government road, saying that instead he would have his people clear the road leading to Mpala mission, where they would bring food to the priests for sale and trade. As the war evolved, Tumbwe Kasambala was accused of covert relations with Islamicised Tanganyikans, still remembered vividly for their slaving recently terminated by concerted colonial effort. The Belgian authorities felt that the Germans exploited this contact, gaining military intelligence from Tumbwe concerning progress in constructing the railhead at Albertville, and about troop movements; this knowledge led to the attack on Cape Tembwe, they implied. Tumbwe was captured, convicted of treason, and sent to prison at Kongolo, where he died some years later.²⁴ Thus, not only was a scapegoat found, but a recalcitrant chief was removed from office.

In contrast, the contribution to the war effort of food produced and carried to various fronts by Tabwa of the Marungu Massif was considerable. By the end of October 1914, less than three months after the war began, 23 metric tonnes of food had been sent to Mpweto, the caravans and other details of exportation supervised by the priests at Baudouinville. By January of the next year, another 28 metric tonnes were added. In 1915, the Mpala mission sent 58 metric tonnes of 'native flour' (maize and/or manioc), 26 metric tonnes of potatoes, 6 metric tonnes of wheat, 2 metric tonnes of onions, and almost 200 lb of honey. Special warehouses were built for this produce, and a military hospital created at Mpala as well. The local territorial administrator, M. Thuysbaert, toured Tabwa chiefdoms monthly to see that each was participating fully. Those chiefs who hesitated or who found it impossible to follow the directives were imprisoned. Because so many men were conscripted as soldiers or porters, those who remained in the villages were hard-pressed to produce the requisite food. By the end of 1915, with the extension of land in use to provide such important harvests, Tabwa found it necessary to remain without respite in their fields from morning till nightfall; even so, all produce, including any reserves, was committed to the war effort. The nutritional status of the Tabwa in the Marungu, despite the relative fertility of the land, was becoming precarious.²⁵

While the Tabwa might see war mobilisation as catastrophically disruptive, some colonial personnel found the situation beneficial to their long-term aims. An administrator reported that contacts and co-operation with Tabwa chiefs had become closer as a consequence of the great number of state agents criss-crossing the territory, and of the presence of large numbers of troops in Tabwa lands. The *Force Publique* visited areas rarely, if ever, seen before by Belgian authorities, evacuating many through labour conscription. Even with this apparent 'amelioration', the administrators wondered if the positive effects would survive the end of the war.²⁶

Through the first months of 1916, the Germans continued to dominate the lake, and their steamers often passed before Mpala and Baudouinville missions. But the Anglo-Belgian effort was beginning to prove successful, shifting from defence to offence. The battle in September of 1915 at the Saisi River to the south of the lake, in which a superior force was beaten back with 20 Germans reported killed and 40 wounded, was a turning point locally, and the end of the first phase of the whole East African campaign. In February of 1916, small Belgian steamers were made ready, and by May, with the start of a

major Belgian offensive, they frequently patrolled the western shore of Lake Tanganyika. Several small planes were secretly assembled near Mtoa, and fitted with bombs for an attack on Kigoma port. Their mission took place in June; but by then Bismarckbourg on the south-eastern shore of the lake had been taken by the English, Bujumbura on the north-eastern shore by the Belgians, and Kigoma had been virtually abandoned by the retreating Germans. Early in September, the important Central Tanganyikan town of Tabora was captured by Anglo-Belgian troops advancing from the west, and the Lake Tanganyika campaign was ended.²⁷

There were many repercussions of the war upon the land and population west of the lake. As an administrator wrote, 'could it be otherwise' given the intensive conscription and requisitioning? With all this coming and going, everyone was apprised of the day-to-day evolution of the war. That 'the white man has made war on another white man, and that *his* white man has defeated the other' was known to every Congolese; and 'it is incontestible', the same agent wrote, 'that this victory ... has considerably augmented the prestige of the Belgians, and consequently, [our] authority among the Congolese population'. The 'surprising means of action', the bravery and endurance of the Belgian officers, must have impressed 'these populations who are naturally bellicose and who admire force and material strength'. Hopefully, 'a respectful and fearful admiration of the colonialists' would result. But there was a less reassuring side to this:

Thousands of natives [porters, stretcher-bearers, labourers] have been involved in the war, have taken part with the soldiers in the engagements which have brought together Europeans and Blacks, have killed and pillaged, and committed the excesses which it is not always possible to prevent in war. The warrior and battling instinct of our native people, restrained, for the most part, by thirty years of European occupation, must have been singularly awakened during this campaign. We may foresee, without pessimism, that differences of a political order as well as personal ones, will be regulated with arms very frequently, if, from the start, a very severe regime is not established so as to repress without delay any bellicose tendency.

It was, above all, the 'revival of passions' that would remain a lurking fear in the minds of the colonialists.²⁸ Inspired by white-supremacist ideas from southern Africa, this would contribute to the implementa-

tion of a colour bar (albeit one never legally sanctioned) in towns throughout Katanga Province till the very last years of the colonial era. Other dire consequences of the wartime activities were exacerbated by natural phenomena. As 1918 began, there was famine in the Marungu Massif, in large measure the result of the heavy requisitions of months past; a drought made the situation worse. At the end of 1917 an outbreak of cerebrospinal meningitis killed 20 in a week; and in mid-1918, pneumonia and whooping cough took a terrible toll among youngsters. The worst was soon to come, for in November 1918, the pandemic of Spanish influenza reached the Congo. By January of the next year, over 100 Europeans and 1,000 Congolese had died in the mining city of Elizabethville. Two months later, more than 1,100 victims had succumbed in the Tabwa chiefdoms of the Massif. Finally, what seemed to the colonisers to be lions killed many Tabwa during the last years of the war and those just after it. Fifty died in the vicinity of the Baudouinville mission during the last four months of 1917, and the first four of 1918. It is possible that lions whose normal prey were severely depleted through extensive hunting by and for soldiers, took some human victims; but most succumbed to attacks by terrorist lion-men. This form of resistance to colonialism had been practised in the 1890s against mission loyalists, and more generally, Tabwa lion-men (*visanguka*) were deployed as a strategy in local-level conflict just short of open fighting. Although little information is available, it can be surmised that influential Tabwa chiefs and others who had been humiliated or punished during the years of war mobilisation were sending lion-men to attack those who had profited and had been rewarded during the same period. The existence of such terrorism would not be recognised as such by the colonial authorities until subsequent outbreaks in the late 1930s.²⁹

All of the above conditions before, during and after the war, had bearing upon local-level politics around the Baudouinville mission. Given the dedication of the missionaries to the tasks they were assigned or voluntarily assumed in the course of the campaign of Lake Tanganyika, one might think that the ideological and political differences between the priests and various government agents would have been laid aside, for the good of the common war effort. One might assume that in the face of the common enemy, a spirit of 'communitas', to borrow Victor Turner's term, might have reigned.³⁰ This was not altogether true, as the case of Manda and Bulani demonstrates.

THE CASE OF MANDA AND BULANI

As many Africanist writers (and most notably those once affiliated with the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute) have demonstrated, an examination of extended cases of conflict, or 'social dramas' as Victor Turner called them, affords a sterling opportunity to study social process.³¹ Through the case at hand, the dynamic manner in which the factions mentioned above (Tabwa, missionaries, and colonial administrators) and their histories are interwoven and dependent through these same war years will become clear.

There are two African protagonists, Manda and François Bulani. Manda is a Tabwa hereditary chief of the Zimba or 'Leopard' clan. He is closely related through kinship and clan to chiefs in north-eastern Zambia and the south-easternmost corner of Zaire. Most versions of Manda's story describe how he fled his southern homeland after a homicide. They differ in the manner in which he is said to have acquired the lands he now occupies. Manda and his supporters hold that they wrested the lands from resident Sanga or 'Bushpig' clan chiefs. The latter bitterly contend that they offered the lands to Manda as one does to newly-arrived potential dependents, and so they should retain ultimate identity with them (or ownership, as we might say). The conflict between the two clans is longstanding, and continues to erupt, sometimes in actual fighting or assassination, but more often in insults, intrigue and litigation.³²

Whatever the legitimacy of Manda's claims, he presented himself as a 'king' to early European explorers such as Joseph Thomson. His village was at the foot of the striking peak Mrumbi, on the edge of the most densely populated portion of the Marungu Massif. Manda signed a treaty with Emile Storms and became a close ally, sending warriors on a number of occasions to support the lieutenant's military adventures, the most important of which were against his rivals, the 'Bushpig' chiefs. When the White Fathers established an outpost south of Mpala in 1884, Manda was supportive. Soon after they assumed control of Storms's station the next year, Father Moinet chose Kisabi the successor to the Manda chiefship. In 1889, at the behest of the priests, Manda Kisabi sent his niece to the mission, to marry the Malta-trained, 'Hausa' medical doctor, Joseph Faraghit; the chief's relation to the missionaries became 'affinal' thereafter, or so he might have wished. In 1895, Captain Joubert named Kisabi's successor. The new chief, Manda Kabunda, would reign until 1939.³³

Manda's harassment, and the generally unacceptable behaviour of Katele, a close kinsman of Manda engaged in slaving, was ended in 1890 when Captain Joubert drove Katele from his fortress and moved there himself, from Mpala. 'Since then, Manda has been confirmed in his chiefship by Captain Joubert, in recognition of the services rendered against the Arabs trafficking in slaves'. St Louis, Joubert's newly-founded town, would later become Moba. When, in 1893, a new mission site was sought to accommodate the refugees from the centre at Kibanga on the north-eastern shore of the lake, the plateau directly above Joubert's post was chosen. This would become Baudouinville, and was recognised as originally having been in Manda's lands.³⁴

François or Fransisko Bulani (or Borani), the other protagonist, was one of the earliest ardent followers of the White Fathers, coming from Rwanda to join the missionaries at their short-lived outpost of Massanze in 1880. He later moved to Kibanga mission near the Ubwari peninsula where he was first a headman of one of the Christian villages, then a *nyampara* or overseer of wider operations. By 1892, he had become chief of Lavigerieville, the town growing about the mission. When, as a consequence of increasing harassment by Rumaliza and his slavers, the order was received to abandon Kibanga, Bulani led more than 1,000 of the faithful to the new mission at Baudouinville, built to accommodate them. There, the importance of his participation in mission affairs continued to grow.³⁵

As Bulani's fortunes rose, Manda's foundered. The early mission diary entries describe Manda in friendly terms, but by the turn of the century there had been a marked shift, reflecting, perhaps, change in mission personnel as well as mission politics. In 1905, a revision of history appeared in a missionary publication, describing the harsh early life of Stefano Kaoze, then a Tabwa seminary student:

A tyrant, the cruel Manda, reigned in the South. Ferocious and daringly enterprising, he had sworn to dominate the whole land from Lake Tanganyika to the frontier of Lubaland. He had sent his warriors throughout the Marungu to tell the inhabitants, 'Here is what will make you know the great Manda. All villages which resist and refuse me tribute will be utterly destroyed. The men will be massacred, and the women and children reduced to slavery'. Sinister exploits soon confirmed these menaces, spreading terror everywhere.

Kaoze's father was murdered by Manda's men, according to this account (but *not* others published at various times by the priests) and the

boy given shelter by Captain Joubert.³⁶ In 1905, unsympathetic priests exploited the tale in their own pursuits; later, similar stories of Manda 'the cruel' would be turned from the chief's detriment to his benefit by supportive administrators 'recreating' his 'Empire' so bloodily begun.

Reduced to the status of a 'simple particular' of the mission, Joubert could no longer exercise the powers he had possessed in the late 1880s and early 1890s, when he was 'king' of the Territory of Mpala. The catechists sent to outlying areas became the ambassadors of the missionaries, while in the several largest towns built up around the missions, the priests selected and saw to the official recognition of strawman chiefs. Bulani filled this role at Baudouinville, as a natural step upward in his long career. In many respects, he replaced Joubert as leader of the Christian Kingdom.

In March 1910, Bulani – most recently acting as 'Burgomaster' of Baudouinville – was sworn in as an official chief by Robert Schmitz, Sector Chief for the *Comité Spécial du Katanga* then governing the region under charter. The population of the Conventual Chiefdom of Kirungu, as Bulani's would be known, comprised the polyglot faithful and Tabwa loyalists living in lands surrounding the mission. According to the mission scribe, Bulani had some misgivings, saying he would rather remain in the direct employ of the Fathers; but he promised that even though he was a member of the colonial government, he would do nothing without the prior approval of the priests.³⁷ That he was recognised chief just *before* the important decree of 2 May 1910, which would spell out the rules for delimiting traditional chiefdoms and those created by convention, would soon prove important.

In 1910, measures were taken by the government to curb the spread of sleeping sickness, then ravaging the Tabwa population. Villages were moved inland to higher plateaux overlooking the lake; houses were burned by the colonial Sector Chief, to speed the process. Some people from Bulani's sphere of power were resettled in the lands designated as Manda's. Manda sought to collect tribute from his new subjects, and allegedly prevented them from realising their Christian religious duties; their resentment was conveyed by the White Fathers to the Belgian Minister of Colonies. Jules Renkin's response, in July 1911, spoke of issues wider than this. 'The greatest benevolence' must be shown those natives wishing to place themselves under the moral and religious direction of the missionaries; those living in chiefdoms formed prior to the May 1910 decree would not be bound by its definition of a chiefdom.³⁸ This only increased the confusion in the minds of those around Baudouinville.

The next year, both chiefdoms were reorganised. Congolese General Commissioner Harfeld declared that Bulani's authority would 'extend to all villages inhabited by Christians following the White Fathers [from Kibanga] or who have come to live around them'. An agent would visit every village, and ask the residents which of the two chiefs they preferred to follow; thereafter, the limits would stand as definitive.³⁹

The unusual nature of this procedure angered certain administrators. One noted that, while Manda Kabunda was indeed an irascible fellow who made greater and greater demands on his subjects and who had undoubtedly alienated some, what would happen if, every time a chief were disliked because he required his subjects to work ever harder for the commonwealth, they were allowed to change their residence and allegiance? M. Mees, then District Commissioner at Kongolo, called Bulani a 'usurper' of Manda's lands and powers, and blasted the missionaries for having presumed to bring complaints to the attention of the Minister in the first place. Others pointed out that the definition of a 'Christian village' was so flexible that the influence of Bulani – and hence of the priests – was growing daily. These 'politics of encroachment' must stop! They would not for some time.⁴⁰

The complaints of his administrators and those of the missionaries were again brought to the Colonial Minister's attention. He noted that more time should be given to Tabwa and other Congolese living around the mission to decide which chief they would follow ever after. He also chastised District Commissioner Mees for his high-handed attitude, saying that criticism should be *sought* from resident Europeans like the White Fathers, not avoided or scorned. There were still difficulties in 1914, and Renkin was again contacted. His response was that 'it is not good politics to impose upon Christian natives who, for some years, have formed a recognised group under a *Christian* chief, the authority of one who remains a polygamous pagan, and who is brutal and even a smoker of cannabis'. All assistance was to be accorded to those who would join Bulani: 'in general, far from dispersing those groups who have already arrived at a better state, it is our duty to favour them, to encourage them and to thus demonstrate to polygamous natives the advantage of their also advancing toward civilisation'.⁴¹

Other territorial agents pursued a different line of reasoning. Manda was said to 'indulge his passion for plundering in a rather intelligent manner': he would requisition large amounts of food from his subjects, sell them and keep the money. Any who complained were

beaten; others were physically mistreated for no apparent reason. Many fled, either southward into Northern Rhodesia, or to the protection of Bulani. On one occasion, Manda allegedly pillaged villages of Bulani, capturing several people in the process. Bulani went with his men to Manda to demand their restitution. The administrator was informed, and he disciplined Manda, forcing him to pay an indemnity. When, shortly thereafter on 1 January 1914, the two chiefs were called to the administrative post to begin reorganisation, only Bulani came. The agent made a census nonetheless, and found that a mere 280 persons remained loyal to Manda, of whom 62 were men; this was only one-half to one-third the number in his chiefdom four years previous. He explained that the Tabwa chief's own actions, gradually and fatally, were destroying his power; and he predicted that Manda would soon disappear altogether.⁴²

The advent of the war in August of 1914 interrupted the correspondence on the Manda–Bulani affair. Thuysbaert, Territorial Administrator of Baudouinville and the surrounding area, was later accused of deliberately suppressing information about relevant events, hiding from the District Commissioner what was happening. Already alienated from the colonial administrators after his humiliation in the incidents late in 1913 mentioned above, Manda was accused of refusing to provide adequate foodstuffs in the course of the monthly war-related requisitions; and that in response, Thuysbaert 'exiled Manda to allow the free expansion of capita Bulani'. In effect, the disconsolate chief was given a pass by Thuysbaert to leave the colony altogether, to live with kinsmen in Northern Rhodesia. In 1916, Thuysbaert was called disloyal for having done this, a term which, in time of war, is only a euphemism's breadth away from treasonous. The same accusatory agent, named Gilson, wondered in another report if Bulani were Rwandan, why was he not interned as were others from the same, German territory?⁴³

Bulani, in the meantime, was doing well for himself, and in many ways justified the confidence the missionaries placed in him. Bulani proved instrumental in the collection of requisitioned food, sent off via porters to the Anglo–Belgian front. Furthermore, while the attempts of the colonial agents at tax collection were invariably disappointing – meeting apathy, flight or hostility as Tabwa reactions – Bulani proved enormously successful at the same task. In 1915, he collected 600 taxes around Baudouinville, and received ½ franc for each as his commission, with which he then purchased a bicycle from the priests. So successful was the combined effort of Bulani and Thuysbaert that

the latter's superior defined to the south, around Moba, a separate zone of activity and accounting for Thuysbaert in apparent contradiction of directives he had received, explaining that the 70,000 francs Thuysbaert submitted in 1915 was more than the sum of all taxes collected in the greater Albertville Territory the year before. By 1919, Bulani was collecting all taxes in the vicinity of the mission, replacing the administrator and freeing him for concentrated attention to the more recalcitrant rural sector. Bulani was also active in assisting the Fathers to stimulate and regulate commerce at Baudouinville. In 1918, construction of a covered market, an adjacent brick house for Bulani and a brick prison was completed, the funds coming from the *caisse du village*, the labour from the mission.⁴⁴

Manda Kabunda, in Northern Rhodesia as of 1916, had the great good fortune and political savvy to contact a young Belgian Territorial Administrator named Gilson, then at the post of Lukonzolwa on the western shore of Lake Mweru. Gilson espoused Manda's cause with enthusiasm. He noted that Manda *did* wish to return to the Congo to resume his functions in the chiefdom in which he had been sworn in as official chief; but that he preferred 'exile to servitude under the orders of the mission chief', Bulani: 'He is discouraged, and seems to be aware that the struggle is useless'. In an affidavit, Manda told Gilson that while he had always co-operated with the missionaries, because he had several wives they told him he was *un mauvais* – a bad one – and that they wanted nothing to do with him. It was they who had forced him to leave his lands, which they gave to Bulani as chief of Manda's own territory.⁴⁵

In November 1918, Gilson's reports on the case took a more strident tone. He noted that in describing Manda as 'pagan, polygamous, brutal, and even a smoker of cannabis', Colonial Minister Renkin must have been in error: had the last two characteristics been true, Thuysbaert, in his capacity as officer of judicial police, should have arrested him on the spot. The fact that Manda was polygamous and supposedly a 'Mohammedan' were reinterpreted as positive, a gauge of his strength and independence in the face of overwhelming opposition by the missionaries. Surely, the minister never meant for Bulani to assume powers expanding 'like an oil spot'; nor could he have meant for Manda's chiefdom to be suppressed. Renkin had acted under the assumption that people of Bulani had been moved to the sphere of Manda. Gilson retorted that this had never been the question, but that instead, Bulani and the White Fathers had drawn Manda's people to the mission. That only very shortly prior to this

report, Renkin and his Catholic Party had been defeated by the Liberals must have influenced Gilson's new posture.⁴⁶

Gilson visited Baudouinville, and complained that in the chiefdom of the absent Manda (of which he considered Bulani's a part), indiscipline reigned. 'The cross and [religious] banner are necessary to find porters', he wrote, when he had difficulty raising any. His experience may be compared with the success Bulani, Thuysbaert and the priests had in mobilising the same population for the war effort; and in collecting taxes, Gilson's ire was informed by this contrast. 'Ill will is felt throughout, and opposes [progress] with all its force of inertia. The natives know they find at Bulani's a special protection. They join him out of personal interest, and comfortably enjoy the quasi-certitude of impunity'. Gilson wrote with irritation of the manner in which Bulani had refused to meet his caravan outside of town, as he was arriving there; and of his obliging Bulani to hoist the flag in his honour, before the brick house, prison and market that he described with sarcasm. 'Civil and territorial authority mean little to this official chief', and the flag-raising was meant to be a humiliating lesson. He proposed a 'severe warning' be given Bulani and, above all, that a stop be put to the 'insidious conquests' of this latter, which had engulfed Manda's and which now threatened other adjacent chiefdoms.⁴⁷

The thrust of this, though, was not so much against Bulani as it was against the mission; for, as Gilson wrote, 'whoever speaks of Bulani, speaks of the missionaries'. Gilson criticised Thuysbaert for having allowed Manda to leave the country, writing that the territorial agent was docilely following the political programme of the priests. Perhaps it was to this very docility that Thuysbaert owed his later success, as a budding merchant in the Baudouinville region. According to the administrator, Monsignor Huys (second to Roelens in the bishopric) held that it was in the interest of the missions that the authority of traditional chiefs be broken. The resulting division of loyalties was the 'greatest element of success [for the missions]. As for Manda [Msgr Huys] flatters himself in thinking this done. The campaign against Tumbwe has begun'. While Gilson and others of his service wished to restore Manda to the past glories they thought must have been his, they realised that to strive for this goal might spell their own martyrdom, given the strength of the missions. But this was the task they chose, and in years to come that they would accomplish.⁴⁸

During the war years, most colonial administrators were conscripted into active military service; the personalities of those few who remained to oversee civilian duties must have loomed particularly large. In this

context, it is instructive to consider the careers of the two agents, Thuysbaert and Gilson, during this time.

In 1912 Thuysbaert was named *Chef de Secteur* at the post of Mlonde (the creation of which Monsignor Roelens so resented); and when that was suppressed the next year, he moved to Moliro as Territorial Administrator. He worked closely with the missionaries in their wartime efforts to provide food for the troops, and in 1915 confiscated for unexplained reasons all merchandise from 'Arab' merchants at Baudouinville, giving it to Joubert's son Pio. In 1917, Thuysbaert resigned his commission, to become a merchant himself.⁴⁹ He settled 20 minutes from the Baudouinville mission, and began what would become a very successful business, with stores, depots, and plantations in the area. The Fathers wished him luck in this endeavour, hoping that this would 'close the door to ambulatory merchants of all races and nationalities' beginning to establish themselves in the area. His success, then, was very much a product of close relations with the missionaries. Gilson's attacks on Thuysbaert's decisions concerning the 'exile' of Manda, were influenced by this.⁵⁰

Gilson was a territorial administrator in September 1916. By November of the same year he was promoted to Deputy, and four years later to Acting District Commissioner. During the war years, rapid advancement was undoubtedly facilitated by lack of personnel; but Gilson's was spectacular by any measure, and could not have occurred had Gilson been at ideological variance with his superiors. It will be recalled that in 1913, the then District Commissioner (Mees) had been critical both of Bulani (a 'usurper') and of the White Fathers. Gilson's position was consistent with that of the man he would replace. Gilson may have been an exceptionally talented administrator, and other issues were important to his rise; but the success of his career was a product of his opposition to the missionaries.⁵¹

The advent of the 1920s marked a change in political thought in the Congo. Legislation was proposed by which the 'disaggregation of indigenous authority' (6,095 independent Congolese chiefdoms in 1917) would be corrected, through the 'guided evolution' of the chiefdoms of true 'royal-blooded' chiefs. 'Great chiefdoms' or paramountcies would be sought where they still existed or where it was possible to revive them. Assumptions determining selection for revival as a royal paramount were only ever vaguely defined, and individual territorial administrators continued to exercise immense power in this regard. By 1922 it could thus be written that 'Manda is the chief clearly indicated' by such logic, and that 'the State has as... its

imperious duty to protect and support this chief', for 'only Manda can re-establish the traditional unity of this region'.⁵² Chiefs with other claims to legitimacy – such as Manda's adversaries of the 'Bushpig' clan – were not even considered candidates. Bulani, in the meantime, saw the delimitation of his powers, but not their diminution within the defined Conventional Chiefdom. At his death in 1924, he was replaced by another non-Tabwa chosen by the mission, who served until his own passing in 1959, on the eve of Congolese independence. Then the chiefdom reverted to Manda's control.

CONCLUSIONS

While the Great War caused severe disruption of the lives of people living south-west of Lake Tanganyika, it did *not* bring a suspension of local-level politics and personal ambitions. Instead, it provided special circumstances in which certain factions could and did flourish, while others withered. In this second phase of the Christian Kingdom, the White Fathers were able to consolidate their position in the local context, extending the influence of their surrogate catechists and strawman chiefs to encompass many of the powers overtly held by their European personnel during the first phase.⁵³ Manda was replaced by Bulani, that the latter then replace Joubert as 'King' of this new Christian Kingdom.

Others wrote different scripts for the same actors. Individual career ambitions were couched in terms of greater ideological positions, so that Manda's demise, and subsequent revival, were effected in terms of the Metropolitan struggle between pro-Catholics and 'Free-thinkers'. The reports of Gilson and others only refer to what was happening *to* Manda, and rarely if ever to what the Tabwa chief himself was doing for self-promotion. Tabwa adversaries to his rise would not be given an ear until the 1930s, when the Sanga clan found their own European supporters, and Stefano Kaoze (ordained in 1917) became a more mature and outspoken proponent of their position. 'Insidious conquests', the stuff of local-level politics, continue today, as the same factions struggle over these unresolved issues of relative power, in the new circumstances of post-colonial Zaire.

NOTES

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The following abbreviations are employed in these notes: ADKM for the *Archives du Diocese de Kalemie-Moba*; AMRAC-FS for the *Archives du Musée Royal de l'Afrique Centrale, Fonds Storms*, located at Tervuren, Belgium; AS/RT for the *Archives de la Sous-Region du Tanganika* at Kalemie, Zaire; BACDRAP for the archives of the *Bureau des Affaires Culturelles, Division Regionale de Affaires Politiques* at Lubumbashi, Zaire; and WF for Missionaries of Africa (White Fathers).

2. E. Storms, untitled pages, MRAC-FS, B-II, F-IV, 14; *Mouvement Geographique*, 9 August 1885, 65. Secondary sources are R. Heremans, *Les établissements de l'Association Internationale Africaine et les Pères Blancs: Mpala et Karema, 1877–1885* (Tervuren, 1966); F. Renault, *Lavigerie: l'esclavage africain et l'Europe* (Paris, 1971); N. Bennett, 'Captain Storms in Tanganyika', *Tanganyika Notes and Records*, 54 (1960) 60–98; A. F. Roberts, "'Fishers of Men": Religion and Political Economy Among Colonized Tabwa', *Africa* 54, 2 (1984) 49–70; and A. F. Roberts, 'History, Ethnicity and Change in the "Christian Kingdom" of Southeastern Zaire', in Leroy Vail (ed.), *The Creation of Tribalism in South and Central Africa* (London, forthcoming).
3. Heremans, *Les établissements*, p. 97. Heremans rethinks this position in a subsequent dissertation, 'Missions et Ecoles: l'éducation dans les missions des Pères Blancs en Afrique Centrale avant 1914', 2 vols, Ph.D. in modern history (Université Catholique de Louvain, 1978) 122 and *passim*.
4. On the 'Christian Kingdom', see Roberts, "'Fishers of Men'"; Joubert's exploits are set forth in T. Houdebine and M. Boumier, *Le capitaine Joubert* (Namur, n.d.); and O. Ulrix, 'Le capitaine Joubert', *Revue Congolaise*, I (1910) 92–108.
5. WF 'Diaire Kibanga', 15 July 1891. Typescript at ADKM; the originals are at the central archives of the White Fathers in Rome. Renault, *Lavigerie*, p. 408 fn.
6. Renault, *Lavigerie*, p. 417. See also L. Greindl, 'Notes sur les sources des Missionnaires d'Afrique (Pères Blancs) pour l'est du Zaire', *Etudes d'Histoire Africaine*, VII (1975) 175–202. L. Joubert, 'Diaire', 26 December 1895; a photocopy of most of the diary is at the National Museum of Zaire, Lubumbashi.
7. Joubert, 'Diaire', 16 August 1896, 28 December 1896, 16 June 1897, 22 March 1899; Anonymous, 'Mouvements du Commandant Des-camps', *Mouvement Antiesclavagiste*, III (1895) 321–2.
8. WF 'Diaire Baudouinville' (henceforth 'Diaire Bville'), 20 November 1902, 28 November 1902.

9. On *chappelles-écoles* in Tabwa lands, see B. Schmitz, 'Chappelles-écoles Namuroises', *Missions d'Afrique (Pères Blancs)* (1903); V. Roelens, 'Les rayons et les ombres de l'Apostolat au Haut-Congo', *Grands Lacs*, 61, 4–6 (1946) 24–8; Heremans, 'Missions et Ecoles'. On the same phenomenon elsewhere in the Congo, see M. Markowitz, *Cross and Sword: The Political Role of Christian Missions in the Belgian Congo, 1908–1960* (Stanford, 1973) pp. 14–15; and elsewhere in Africa, R. Strayer, *The Making of Mission Communities in East Africa* (New York, 1978) pp. 52–66.
10. CF., Strayer, *Mission Communities*, p. 45 and *passim*.
11. WF 'Diaire Bville', 12 February 1907, 21 July 1908, 4 February 1910.
12. WF 'Diaire Bville', September 1908, January 1909.
13. WF 'Diaire Bville', July 1911, 8 October 1908, May 1909, 16 July 1910. The tax collector's brash act is mentioned but not explained in the diary.
14. WF 'Diaire Bville', 10 March 1913, 17 June 1913. This issue is discussed in the context of the political economy of the Tabwa area, in A. F. Roberts, "'The Ransom of Ill-Starred Zaire": Plunder, Politics and Poverty in the OTRAG Concession', in G. Gran (ed.), *Zaire: The Political Economy of Underdevelopment* (New York, 1979) pp. 211–36.
15. A. Sluys, cited in 'Main-mise de la Maçonnerie sur le Congo Belge en trois ans', *Le Patriote*, 20 February 1913. For the Masonic or otherwise critical view, see F. Catter, *Etude sur la situation de l'Etat Independent* (Brussels, 1905).
16. See V. Roelens, 'Une bonne reponse', *Missions d'Afrique (Pères Blancs)*, (1905); V. Roelens, 'La liberte de l'apostolat au Congo', *Le Patriote*, 27 February 1913; Anonymous, 'Comment les missionnaires sont traités au Congo: graves declarations de Mgr Roelens', *Le Patriote*, 9 February 1913; Anonymous, 'La question des missionnaires au Congo: une lettre du ministre des colonies, la reponse de Mgr Roelens', *Le Bien Publique*, 12 February 1913; A. Vermeersch, *Sur nègres ou Chrétiens* (Brussels, 1911).
17. 'Une lettre de Mr Renkin aux Superieurs des Missions', *Le Bien Publique*, 4 March 1913. On the Cambier affair, see 'Au Congo: le calomniateur du R. P. Cambier', *Le Patriote*, 26 July 1913, for the pro-Catholic viewpoint; 'Annexe au compte rendu analytique', *Chambres des Représentants*, 4 March 1913. See also 'Les deux "civilisations" au Congo', *Le Patriote*, 26 February 1913, citing a relevant article in *Le Matin* of 14 February 1913. For a critical appraisal, see 'Mr Renkin et les missionnaires', *La Gazette*, 5 March 1913.
18. Markowitz, *Cross and Sword*, 20; WF 'Diaire Bville', June 1910, April 1911, 12 September 1911; 'Les maçons au Congo', *Le Patriote*, 9 December 1913.
19. The bulk of the following information is from the Baudouinville diary kept by the White Fathers, where a running, if sketchy, commentary is recorded. Reference here is to entries from August to October 1914. The Lake Tanganyika campaign receives very little attention in the literature. For Belgian military memoirs, see G. Moulart, *La campagne du Tanganika (1916–1917)* (Brussel, 1934); and C. Stienon, *La campagne anglo-belge de l'Afrique Orientale Allemande* (Paris, 1917).

20. WF 'Diaire Bville', 28 September 1914. Lemaire, 'Rapport sur la reconnaissance effectuée du 4 mai au 13 juillet 1914' (Albertville, 14 July 1914); District Commissioner for Tanganika-Moero, 'Rapport politique des 3ème et 4ème trimestres 1914' (Kongolo, 27 July 1915); both mss at AS/RT.
21. WF 'Diaire Bville', entries from January to July 1915; A. Marissaux, *Albertville: Note historique* (Brussels, n.d.); P. von Lettow-Vorbeck, *East African Campaigns* (New York, 1957) p. 86. Lt Robert Billen, slain at Tembwe, was buried in a war cemetery at Mpala with the Congolese soldiers killed with him. Tabwa still resent that Billen was interred across a path from his African soldiers, in a grave surrounded by heavy chain. Tabwa assume this was to restrain his spirit from interacting with those of the black Congolese.
22. R. Cornevin, *Histoire du Congo* (Paris, 1970) pp. 178-9; J-A. Wullus-Rudiger, *La Belgique et la crise européenne, 1914-1943* (Brussels, c. 1943) pp. 82-3. WF 'Diaire Mpala', August 1915.
23. WF 'Diaire Bville', 5 March 1915; M. deBaer, 'Chefferie de Tumbwe, rapport d'enquête' (Albertville, 20 March 1918), AMRAC (my thanks to Dr G. Nagant for this reference); M. deBaer, 'Historique de la Chefferie des Bena Kunda' (Albertville, 20 May 1918), BACDRAP d/Kalemie.
24. deBaer, 'Chefferie de Tumbwe'; Lemaire, 'Rapport sur la reconnaissance'. The Germans alleged that other lakeside Congolese were hanged by the Belgians for collaboration; see Lettow-Vorbeck, *East African Campaigns*, p. 86.
25. WF 'Diaire Bville', 22 October 1914, 14 January 1915, 2 November 1915. In the best of Tabwa lands there are two maize harvests, in February-March and in June-July; in less fertile ones, there is a single harvest in early summer. Manioc is harvested all year.
26. District Commissioner for Tanganika-Moero, 'Rapport politique des ler et 2ème trimestres 1915' (Kongolo, 26 August 1915) AS/RT.
27. WF 'Diaire Bville' and 'Diaire Mpala', entries 1915-16; W. Downes, *With the Nigerians in German East Africa* (London, 1919) pp. 26-7; 39; R. Dolbey, *Sketches of the East African Campaign* (London, 1918) p. 44.
28. Van den Boorgaerde, 'Rapport annuel 1917: participation du District [du Tanganika-Moero] aux opérations militaires en AOA' (Kongolo, 18 March 1918) AS/RT.
29. WF 'Diaire Bville', 23 January 1918, 28 February 1918, 24 October 1917, 10 September 1918, 2 November 1918, 10 January 1919, 26 March 1919, 13 April 1919. The Marungu appears to have been spared the ravages of dysentery 'brought from Tanganika', which took a terrible toll among the Kuba of Kasai at this time (J. Vansina, personal communication, 1980). Tabwa lion-men and terrorism are discussed in A. F. Roberts, "'Perfect" Lions, "Perfect" Leaders: A Metaphor for Tabwa Chiefship', *Journal de la Société des Africanistes* 53, 1-2 (1983) 93-105, and A. F. Roberts, "'Like a Roaring Lion": Late 19th Century Tabwa Terrorism', in Donald Crummey (ed.), *Banditry, Rebellion and Social Protest in Africa* (Portsmouth, NH, 1986), pp. 65-86. Related cases of local-level politics and conflict resolution are in A. F. Roberts,

- 'Anarchy, Abjection and Absurdity: A Case of Metaphoric Medicine Among the Tabwa of Zaire', in L. Romanucci Ross *et al.* (eds.), *The Anthropology of Medicine: From Theory to Method* (New York, 1983) pp. 119-33; A. F. Roberts, "'L'Authenticité", "l'alienation" et l'homicide: dossier d'un processus social au Zaire rural', in B. Jewsiewiki (ed.), *Pratiques et savoirs populaires en Afrique* (Paris, forthcoming); A. F. Roberts, 'The Comeuppance of "Mr. Snake", and Other Tales of Survival from Contemporary Rural Zaire', in N. Nzongola-Ntalaja (ed.), *The Crisis in Zaire: Myths and Realities* (Trenton, 1986), pp. 113-123.
30. V. Turner, *The Ritual Process* (Chicago, 1969).
31. V. Turner, *Schism and Continuity in an African Society* (Manchester 1968). A straightforward explanation of this approach is in J. Van Velson, 'The Extended-Case Method and Situational Analysis', in A. Epstein (ed.), *The Craft of Social Anthropology* (New York, 1967) pp. 129-180.
32. 'Manda' is spoken of by Tabwa (as here) as being a single person, whereas his is a hereditary name, inherited by a succession of chiefs. Discussion of this long-standing conflict between Manda and his followers of the 'Leopard' clan, and chiefs and their people of the 'Bushpig' clan, appears in the author's writing cited above, and in A. F. Roberts, 'The Social and Historical Contexts of Tabwa Art', in A. F. Roberts and E. M. Maurer (eds), *The Rising of a New Moon: A Century of Tabwa Art* (Ann Arbor, 1986).
33. J. Thomson, *To the Central African Lakes and Back* (London, 1968, 1st edn 1881) II, pp. 42-3; E. Storms, 'Journal de la Station de Mpala', 2 January 1885, 1 April 1885, AMRAC-FS; WF 'Diaire Kapakwe'; I. Moinet, 'Letter to E. Storms', (Mpala, 8 October 1886), AMRAC-FS, B-II, F-X, 38; WF 'Diaire Mpala', 27 September 1889; Joubert, 'Diaire', 9 April 1895.
34. Joubert, 'Diaire'; Anonymous, 'Chefferie de Tumpa' (n.d.), BACDRAP d/Moba; V. Roelens, *Notre Vieux Congo, 1891-1917* (Namur, 1948) p. 47.
35. WF 'Diaire Mpala', 27 December 1880; WF 'Diaire Kibanga', 31 August 1887, 19 March 1891, 24 April 1892, 22 July 1893; WF 'Diaire Bville', February 1893, 9 July 1894.
36. Anonymous, 'L'Histoire d'un Seminariste Noir', *Missions d'Afrique (Pères Blancs)* (1905) p. 290. This version of Manda's history, and the early years of Stefano Kaoze, are presented in Msgr Kimpinde *et al.*, *Stefano Kaoze, Pretre d'hier et d'aujourd'hui* (Kinshasa, 1982).
37. WF 'Diaire Bville', 10 March 1910.
38. WF 'Diaire Bville', 13 March 1910; Renkin's circular of 10 July 1911 and other relevant passages are in District Commissioner, Adjoint [Gilson], 'Affaire Manda/Bulani' (n.d. but probably April 1922), BACDRAP d/Manda.
39. Thuysbaert, 'Chefferies indigenes' (Kongolo, 2 October 1913) BACDRAP d/Manda.
40. Thuysbaert, 'Chefferies indigenes'; Mees, letters of 19 April 1913, and 14 October 1912, cited in J. Renkin, 'Letter to Vice Governor General', 2025/sp38k (Brussels, 14 July 1913) both BACDRAP d/Manda.

41. Renkin, letter of 14 July 1913; Renkin, 'Letter to Vice Governor General', 2795/sp62k (Brussels, 2 April 1914) BACDRAP d/Manda.
42. Van der Maelen, 'Chefferies Manda et Bulani' (Albertville, 18 January 1914) BACDRAP d/Manda.
43. Gilson, note of 26 November 1916, attached to Thuysbaert, 'Letter to District Commissioner', 128/83 (Kala, 2 August 1916); Gilson, 'Letter to District Commissioner', 94 (Vua, 13 November 1918); Gilson, 'Letter to District Commissioner', 901/*frontieres* (Pweto, 6 September 1916) all BACDRAP d/Manda. H. Kissi, 'Mafasario juu ya maneno ya inchi ipatikanayo katika Territoire ya Baudouinville' (Bville, 1961) BACDRAP d/Bazimba.
44. WF. 'Diaire Bville', 20 February 1915, 3 May 1919, 25 August 1913, 5 June 1918; Van den Boogaerde, 'Rapport politique des 3ème et 4ème trimestres 1915, District Tanganika-Moero' (Kongolo, 4 February 1916) AS/RT. Unfortunately, the diaries say nothing of the means employed by Bulani in achieving this extraordinary success, nor did I pursue the point while in the field. As Jan Vansina has suggested in private communication (1980), 'there must be something untold here!'
45. Gilson, 'Note for District Commissioner' (Lukonzolwa, 4 February 1916); Gilson, letter of 6 September 1916; Gilson, 'Procès-Verbal' (Pweto, 6 September 1916) all BACDRAP d/Manda. Polygamy was an issue of abiding interest to the White Fathers, and the focus of some of their most direct attacks on indigenous culture. Chief Mpala was also replaced in 1911 by a strawman, ostensibly over the polygamy question.
46. Gilson, 'Manda/Bulani' (Pweto, 28 November 1918) BACDRAP d/Terr. Bazimba; Markowitz, *Cross and Sword*, table of party affiliations, p. 24.
47. Gilson, 'Manda/Bulani'. Gilson's mention of 'special protection' is an ironic reference to Catholic confession.
48. District Commissioner, Adjoint [Gilson], 'Affaire Manda/Bulani'; Gilson, note of 26 November 1916; District Commissioner, Adjoint [Gilson], 'Notes sur Manda pour M. le Commissaire de District' (Kongolo, 20 April 1922) all BACDRAP d/Manda. In the 1930s, Tumbwe would be made paramount in the north of Tabwa territory, as Manda would be in the south.
49. As Professor Vansina has noted in personal communication (1980), this was unusual since, while the Lake Tanganyika campaign might be ended and the troops disbanded, the war had yet to be resolved, and Thuysbaert was still 'mobilised'.
50. WF 'Diaire Bville', 22 May 1912, 22 November 1913, 13 November 1914, 17 February 1915, 8 October 1917, 17 March 1920.
51. Gilson, letter of 6 September 1916; Gilson, note of 26 November 1916; Gilson, 'Letter to Territorial Administrator at Moliro', 1221 (Kongolo, 6 May 1920) BACDRAP d/Moba. Thuysbaert may have been related to a contemporary of the same name who represented the Catholic Party in the Belgian Parliament, and Gilson may have had similarly well-placed kin among Belgian Liberals. The careers of both

- may have been influenced significantly and positively by such contacts. Thanks to Professor Jan Vansina for this insight.
52. Archives du Congo Belge, Section Documentation, 'Documents pour servir a la connaissance des populations du Congo Belge: Aperçu historique (1886-1933) de l'étude des populations autochtones' (Leopoldville, 1958); District Commissioner, Adjoint [Gilson], 'Affaire Manda/Bulani'; Gilson, 'Notes sur Manda'.
 53. Missionaries in other parts of eastern Congo were able to extend their material and moral influence during these troubled times; see Mushagasha Chakirwa, 'Note sur la dynamique d'une mission du Kivu: Nyangezi (1906-1929)', *Etudes d'Histoire africaine*, VII (1975) pp. 125-35.